Iran who is in power

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The Council sponsors several hundred meetings each year, provides up-to-date information and analysis on its website CFR. He also appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians, the powerful body that oversees the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to run for public office.

Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, The Supreme Leader's sphere of power is extended through his representatives, an estimated 2, of whom are sprinkled throughout all sectors of the government and who serve as the Leader's clerical field operatives.

In some respects the Supreme Leader's representatives are more powerful than the president's ministers and have the authority to intervene in any matter of state on the Supreme Leader's behalf.

While the president has a high public profile, however, his power is in many ways trimmed back by the constitution, which subordinates the entire executive branch to the Supreme Leader. In fact, Iran is the only state in which the executive branch does not control the armed forces. The president is responsible for setting the country's economic policies. Though he has nominal rule over the Supreme National Security Council and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, in practice the Supreme Leader dictates all matters of foreign and domestic security.

Eight vice presidents serve under the president, as well as a cabinet of 22 ministers. The Council of Ministers must be confirmed by Parliament. On 24 June Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as Iran's sixth president.

He swept to the presidential post with a stunning 17,, votes out of a total of 27,, votes cast in the runoff election. The chief justice - currently a hardline cleric, Ebrahim Raisi - also nominates the six lay members of the Guardian Council. The judiciary, in partnership with security and intelligence services, has cracked down harshly on dissent and is frequently accused by human rights activists of overseeing unfair trials of people facing vaguely defined national security charges.

Of Iran's population of 83 million, some 58 million people - all those over 18 - are eligible to vote. Young people constitute a large part of the electorate, with almost half of the population under 30 years old.

The IRGC was set up after the revolution to defend the Islamic system and to provide a counterweight to the military. It has since become a major armed, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader. It also controls the paramilitary Basij Resistance Force, which has helped suppress domestic dissent. All senior IRGC and military commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader, who is the commander-in-chief, and are answerable only to him.

Members of the cabinet, or Council of Ministers, are chosen by the president. They must be approved by parliament, which can also impeach ministers. The cabinet is chaired by the president or first vice-president, who is responsible for cabinet affairs.

Image source, Anadolu Agency. Supreme Leader. Image source, Reuters. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been the Supreme Leader since Image source, EPA. The main obstacle to the implementation of President Khatami's reform program has until now been the opposition of the legislative and judiciary branches, which have the power to obstruct -- or expedite -- the implementation of the president's liberalization measures.

But the sixth parliamentary elections have the potential to change this. The first round, held on February 18, , ended with a sweeping victory by the reformist candidates. The outcome of that round made clear that the reformists will have at least an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament, or about of seats.

Despite their clear victory in the elections, however, the reformists prudently refrained from exuberance and exultation about their triumph so as not to antagonize their defeated opponents more than necessary. Instead of humiliating them after the first round of the elections, the reformers around Khatami sent the traditionalist right conciliatory messages and gestures, probably because they were aware that the traditionalist right still held the levers of power the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, and so forth that could be used all too efficiently against the reformers if they did not honor the traditionalists' "red lines.

If the reformers win the second round of the elections as well -- and many indicators point in that direction -- they will control two-thirds of the seats in the new parliament, which will probably start its formal legislative session in the autumn of Bolstered by such a broad majority, Khatami and his supporters will not have to worry about the traditionalist right opposition to reformist legislation or to Khatami's choice of cabinet ministers.

If the reformers remain united, their main objectives in the next year will probably be the expansion and consolidation of the achievements of Khatami's presidency. In view of the powers of the parliament, the chances are good that the reformists will find success in the areas of press, television, and radio freedoms, which would enhance the flowering of different sectors of Iran's civil society.

Much more difficult will be the fight for the creation of a more independent judiciary and for giving the parliament more control over the security services; such demands will directly affect not only the power base of many of the traditionalist-right leaders but even the powers of the supreme leader himself. Thus, pressure from students, who are pressing for more hasty and radical reforms, and parliamentary demands for increased authority could lead to an intensification of the power struggle between the traditionalist right and the reformists.

The tendency toward schism and factionalism in both camps will probably continue even beyond the parliamentary elections and might even lead to new political coalitions among current opponents. As long as they have not achieved groundbreaking successes in restructuring the country's political framework, it is unlikely that the reformers will occupy themselves with such complicated tasks as the urgently needed reform of the ailing Iranian economy or the reestablishment of normal relations with the United States.

Policy Analysis Monographs. Jan 1, About the Authors. Wilfried Buchta. In-Depth Reports. To top. Brief Analysis.